

DRAFT

Mr. John Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

One of the most critical responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency at the present time is the compilation of periodic estimates of the capabilities and progress of the USSR in designing, producing, and stockpiling atomic bombs. In the light of recent developments reflecting successful Soviet espionage efforts against U.S. atomic energy installations, I am deeply concerned over the validity of such estimates and particularly desirous that all possible information bearing upon Soviet capabilities in this field be carefully considered in connection with future estimates.

I feel that in the past there has been insufficient utilization of available counterespionage information as at least a partial basis for estimating Soviet capabilities in the atomic energy field. One of the primary factors in any such estimate is, of course, the extent to which the results of U.S. and other research and development have become available to the Soviet Union through espionage and other means. Knowledge of substantial compromise of U.S. atomic energy information by the Soviet intelligence services can easily be sufficient to completely change the estimates of Soviet capabilities. For example, the periodic estimate which was produced in July 1949 would have been substantially changed had the Central Intelligence Agency been aware of the extent of the information divulged to the Soviet intelligence services by Dr. Karl Julius Klaus FUCHS. Subsequent developments have demonstrated that this estimate was too low and consequently gave an inaccurate and unrealistic picture of Soviet capabilities. Capability estimates currently in preparation and to be prepared in the future should be materially affected by available counterespionage information indicating the extent of Soviet access to classified U.S. information in the atomic energy field.

I am particularly concerned over this problem in view of the fact that the most basic U.S. plans and policies are conditioned by the intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities. Any failure to utilize all available information bearing on this problem can, as I

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am sure you will agree, result in the gravest consequences and in serious prejudice to our national interests.

This Agency has received very little detailed information reflecting the extent of Soviet intelligence successes against U.S. atomic energy installations and personnel. In view of the seriousness of this situation and the overriding national interests involved, it is requested that the Central Intelligence Agency be furnished with all information presently in your possession indicating actual or probable disclosure to the Soviet intelligence services, or to other intelligence services, of critical or classified information concerning atomic energy. It is also requested that this Agency be advised at the earliest possible time of any actual or probable disclosures of such information which may come to your attention in the future. Of particular value will, of course, be specific details on the exact information compromised and on the technical competence and extent of access to critical information of any individual identified as, or suspected of being, an agent of a Soviet or other intelligence service.

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